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The establishment of the Federal Reserve system gave prom-
ise of sweeping aside a half century of unsound bank collec-
tion practices. The most spectacular of these, the one which
largely preoccupied the economists interested in banking, was
that of circuitous routing.' Under this practice items on rela-
tively close points were often shunted back and forth across
the country for days and even weeks before finally being pre-
sented for payment, and then, in event of dishonor, were sent
back through the same devious route to reach the depositor
again. The method was slow, costly, and fraught with risk.
The additional handling increased the chance of error, the delay
increased the risk of non-payment, and, even when payment was
made, the multiplication of banks increased the risk of loss
through bank failure.
Coupled with this practice, and in part accounting for it,
were other evils of even more serious character. With the in-
auguration of the National Banking System during the Civil
War, ending the previous years of wildcat banking, the prac-
tice developed of giving depositors immediate credit for out of
town checks, with the attendant privilege of drawing against
the credit at once.2 This was induced by competition for ac-
counts and made possible in part because such items might be
sent on to city correspondents who in turn would give immediate
credit subject to drawing, the credit counting at once as part
of the depositing banks reserves. Such banks in turn were often
able to send the item on to other banks in larger centers ,and
to count the credit received as part of their reserves. It takes
no argument to demonstrate that this pyramiding procesd con-
stituted only a paper reserve, and in times of financial stress,
when large numbers of items had to be charged back unpaid, it
was apparent that the system was altogether unsatisfactory.3
The New York and large city banks generally, which assisted
in bringing about this situation, were probably motivated largely
by a desire to increase deposits; and to avoid loss through pay-
' SPAHR, THE CLEARING AND COLLECTION OF CHECKS (1926) 103.
2 Turner, Deposits of Demand Paper as "Purchases"" (192a) S7 YA1M
L. J. 874.
3 SPAHR, op. cit. supra note 1, at 111.
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ment of high collection costs, they found it necessary to build
up a widespread network of correspondents which would handle
collections without charge. Of course the country banker hav-
ing need for exchange and being given immediate credit for
his collections would agree in turn to handle collections sent
to him by the city banker without charge. It was often arranged
also that items which were sent direct to these banks would be
remitted for without exchange charges. In many cases mutual
accounts were established, collection items being credited by
each and at once subject to drawing, or under an arrangement
whereby settlement was made at periodic intervals.' This
effort to save charges contributed directly to the practice of
cf-cuitous routing, since, wherever possible, items were sent
only to banks with which a satisfactory collection arrangement
could be made.5
-The Federal Reserve system was designed, in part, to correct
this situation. In the first place it was provided that member
banks must maintain reserves only with Federal Reserve banks.
A collection system was inaugurated -to ser-ve all banks in the
district, whether members or not, which was to function to some
extent as do clearing houses for local collections. Credit was
given at once, as a matter of convenience, for all eligible items,
4 One of the best discussions of bank collection practices is found in
Federal Reserve Bank v. Peters, 139 Va. 45, 123 S. E. 379 (1924). The
case of Commercial Bank v. Armstrong, 148 U. S. 50, 13 Sup. Ct. 533
(1893) illustrates the periodic settlement practice. This practice is being
,used today in connection with those southern banks -which refuse to
remit at par on daily presentations.
s It is interesting to note that there existed almost no legal sanction
to control this practice. It is usually stated that the depositor may recover
damages from his bank for losses due to circuitous routing, but there
does not appear to be any authority squarely in point. Cf. Henefin v.
Livestock National Bank, 116 Neb. 331, 217 N. W. 91 (1927). The older
cases related to whether presentment was sufficiently prompt to charge
secondary parties. In Gregg & Co. v. Beane, 69 Vt. 22, a7 AtM 248 (1895),
the drawer -as held discharged, thus implying that the forwarding bank
would be liable to its depositor. This case was promptly followed by
legislation providing that forwarding "in the usual course of business"
should constitute "due diligence." VT. GnN. LAws (1917) § 2853; PAToIT,
DIGEST (1926) § 1505(a). Other states have reached much the same
result under the Negotiable Instruments Law. See Plover Savings Bank
v. Moodie, 135 Iowa 685, 110 N. W. 29 (1906). Since the adoption of
direct forwarding there has been some intimation that a collecting bank
should be required to send collections in that way or be liable to suit
for damages. Federal Land Bank v. Barrow, 189 N. C. 303, 127 S. E. 3
(1925). But of. Dudley v. Phenx-Girard Bank, 216 Ala. 591, 114 So.
188 (1927).
There are so many legitimate factors involved in routing collections
that it is doubtful that any direct control can be applied which would
not do more harm than good. The circuitous routing practice in its erag-
gerated form has largely disappeared.
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since the great majority of them would be paid in due course'
and the relatively few dishonored could be charged back as spe-
cial cases. Such credits, however, were not to count as reserves
or be subject to drawing. until, the relative item had been
actually collected. But here again most items were duly paid,
and accordingly a schedule was prepared showing the usual
time required to receive returns on an item on any given point,
and thereafter credits were counted toward reserves upon the
basis of this schedule. Thus the amount of an item on a tvo
day point could be couited after two days, whether in fact
collection had been made or not, but in case of dishonor, the
unusual case, the amount would be charged back and of course
-would no longer count as reserves. 6
This plan contemplated the forwarding of items, where pos-
sible, directly to the bank on which drawn, a shift to the
opposite extreme from that of routing items circuitously.7 .It
was further provided that the drawee banks should remit with
drafts on the particular Federal Reserve bank, or, failing that,
in some other equally acceptable foran. This was but a logical
extension of the clearing house practice of settling differences
by draft, but represented a marked change in that the Federal
Reserve banks assumed no responsibility for the ultimate pay-
ment of such drafts.8 Thus in theory it was expected that a
minimum of time would be required to handle collections, that
the detail otherwise involved would be greatly reduced since only
one collection letter would be required, that is, assuming all
items on a particular bank were to be put through the Federal
Reserve banks, and that the depositor would have reasonable
protection in that the type of remittance drafts to be accepted
was carefully prescribed. Some responsibility also was assumed
by the Reserve banks to keep intimately in touch wvitli the
drawee, a further important safeguard. The plan has been
GPascagoula National Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 11
F. (2d) 866 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926), certiorari denied, 271 U. S..685, 46
Sup. Ct. 637 (1926). The Court here refused the demand of a member
bank to be given inmediate credit in its reserve account for collection
items.
7A great many banks had always sent many collections directly to the
bank upon which drawn, particularly where the drawee was regarded as
financially strong. In the case of customers' items, however, this was
done at the forwarding bank's peril.8 In the case of the local clearing house the debtor banks are usually
required to settle differences with certified checks and the creditor banks
are at once paid so that there is very little risk. Of course this was
not possible in the Federal Reserve clearing system where several days
must often elapse between the time of sending out items by mail and the
time when returns could be received.
In. some cases where the drawee has an account with the forwarding
bank,, it is agreed that the forwarding ank may charge the drawee bank's
470 [Vol. so
BANK COLLECTIONS
remarkably successful, though, as might be expected, not com-
pletely so.
Although the desirability of the direct forwarding plan be
admitted, it is quite another matter to fit it into the existing
.body of statutes, decisions and practices. One of the -first
serious obstacles met with by the Reserve banks developed into
the now historic par clearance controversy,10 which resulted in
a considerable loss of prestige to the System. Banks in many
places, particularly in the South, refused to remit in exchange
at par when items were forwarded to them direct. Their con-
tention was that their contract was only with the depositor and
called for no more than counter payment; to be required to
pay in exchange at par was to add a charge which they had not
agreed to bear. At the bottom of the controversy lay the fact
that the plan would result in a considerable loss of income to
such banks. As a consequence there are now laws in many states
providing that where a drawer has not stipulated to the con-
trary on the face of a check forwarded by a Federal Reserve
bank to the drawee for remittance, the drawee may remit in
exchange and deduct for exchange charges.2 The matter has
thus reached a stalemate as to such banks.
Another obstacle to direct routing, one more easily circum-
vented by the Reserve banks, but still -one of considerable
difficulty, was met with in the common law rule that it is negli-
gence for an agent bank to forward items by mail for payment
to the bank on which drawn.W 2 Probably no point in banking
law is better settled, it being deemed negligence even where the
account if na remittance is received after a stated time. Federal Reserve
Bank v. Early, 30 F. (2d) 198 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929).
The Reserve banks have also been very prompt to follow up collection
letters which are not remitted for according to schedule. Cf. Carson v.
Federal Reserve Bank, 226 App. Div. 225, 235 N. Y. Supp. 197 (1929).
:o Cf. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta,
262 U. S. 643, 43 Sup. Ct. 649 (1923).; see Comment (1924) 33 YALE L. J.
752.
,'The vaous statutes are cited in Comment (1929) 8 N. C. L. RE.
55. The comment discusses two interesting recent cases which have con-
strued the effect of these statutes upon the bolder's rights: (a) against
the drawer, when the drawee's remittance draft is dishonored, and (b)
against the collecting bank, for alleged negligence in receiving a draft
in: payment Morris v. Cleve, 197 N. C. 253, 148 S. E. 253 (1929); Braswell
v. Citizens Nat. Bank, 197 N. C. 229, 148 S. E. 236 (1929).
RRSE, BANS Aim BANKIG (6th ed. 1928) § 236. It has some-
times been said that the New York court sanctions direct forwarding.
The case relied upon is that of Indig v. National City Bank, SO, N. Y.
100 (1880), where a forwarding bank was held privileged to send a mote
to the bank where payable. This case has since been strictly limited
to its facts, if not overruled. National Revere Bank v. Nat. Bank of the
Republic, 172 N. Y. 102, 64 N. E. '99 (1902).
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drawee is the only bank in the locality.13 When one examines
these cases from the depositor's standpoint, one at a time, as
they are presented to the courts, it is without doubt true that
his interests would have been much better served had the col-
lection been handled through some agency which could have
made a personal demand for cash. A drawee bank in failing
conidition can, and all too often does, defer remitting for mail
presentments for days, in the meantime paying out much of
its cash on counter or clearinghouse obligations before finally
failing. -
The Federal Reserve banks avoided the common law rule, in-
sofar as they were concerned, by the simple expedient of con-
tracting with the banks using their service for the privilege of
direct forwarding.'5 This was followed in many cases by such
banks in turn stipulating with their customers for a like privi-
lege. In fact it was held by a lower Pennsylvania court in 1925
that a bank sending an item for collection to a correspondent,
knowing that it customarily sent items direct to the drawee,
could be held responsible for negligence.10 If this decision
were to be generally followed any bank sending collections
through the Federal Reserve banks would be responsible in case
of loss through direct forwarding. A great number of banks
since then have adopted clauses authorizing direct forwarding.1
Within the last few years, also, many states have adopted short
statutes sanctioning the practice as to all banks. The change,
both by statute and stipulation, has taken place as might
be expected without providing for any of the safeguards
obtaining in the case of direct forwarding by the Federal
Reserve banks.'3 This is to disregard to a considerable extent
1 Winchester Milling Co. v. Bank of Winchester, 120 Tenn. 225, 111
S. W. 248 (1908), 18 L. R. A. (N. S.)- 441 (1909).
14 In the state of Nebraska alone there were 128 bank failures in the
first eleven months of 1929. See briefs, Able State Bank v. Weaver, Neb.
Sup. Ct. No. 27070, decided Dec. 1929.
15 The direct forwarding provision was construed in Federal Reserve
Bank v. Malloy, 264 U. S. 160, 44 Sup. Ct. 296 (1924).
IdBank of Wesleyville v. Rose, 85 Pa. Sup. Ct. 52 (1925). Accord:
People's State Bank v. Kismet Equity Exchange Ass'n, 281 Pac. 899
(Kan. 1929).
1TIn 1925 the General Counsel of the American Bankers Association
prepared a form for general use among banks which among other things
provided for direct forwarding. PATON, DIGEST (1926) Opinions 1446,
1446a.
18 It is to be noted that the widespkead use of the direct forwarding
system constitutes a considerable change in practice. When it is con-
sidered that banks have now by statute or stipulation, also largely ob-
viated the rule that, upon giving a depositor credit for an item with
privilege of drawing, the bank becomes a purchaser, it is apparent that
the risk is definitely put upon the depositor as to most items handled for
[Vol. 39
BANK COLLECTIONS
the depositor's interest in favor of banking convenience. 0
To begin with it is not altogether clear that presentment by
mail complies -with the requirements of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law in order to charge secondary. parties. The statute
contemplates a personal presentation. "The instrument must be
exhibited to the person from whom payment is demanded, and
when it is paid must be delivered up to the party paying it." -
And if it is true that direct forwarding constitutes negligence on
the part of the forwarding agent, it would seem that the same
argument would apply here too, possibly -with greater force, for
the protection of secondary parties. Where the instrument
goes unpaid through delay on the part of the drawee, the re-
sponsibility of secondary parties would seemingly be continued,
if the presentment is to be sustained, in a case where they
otherwise should have been discharged.
The English cases prior to the adoption of the Bills of Ex-
change Act uniformly held that where a custom to forward
checks by post to the drawee could be shown, such method would
be considered a good presentment, and presumably further that
the forwarding bank could not be held responsible. The ques-
tion was squarely raised in Heijwood v. Picketing,; ' where the
drawee delayed several days after receiving the check and sub-
sequently failed without paying it. The theory adopted seems to
have been that the drawee occupies a dual relation and, in its
capacity as agent of the forwarder, presents to itself as drawee;
the drawer cannot object to the selection of the drawee as agent,
collection. Of course there is, at the same time, a large amount of paper
in course of collection which is owned by banks. For a discussion of the
capacity in which banks receive collections, see Turner, op. cit. sdzpra
note 2.
" Under the usual method of routing collections, the exaggerated forms
of circuitous routing to one side, it usually took at least one day longer
to effect collection than if items were forwarded direct to the drawee.
This was true because the local bank would generally be unable to clear
such items until the day following their receipt. Had they come direct
to the drawee they could have been remitted for on the same day. This
increase in the element of "float," items in course of collection, represents
values up into millions of dollars throughout the country, and the interest
cost of continuing it for even one day additional amounts at the end of
the year to an enormous charge. There appears never to have been
made a thorough analysis of the costs and risks involved in the two sys-
tems based upon a study of actual experience, and obviously until this
is done the extent of the saving effected by direct routing must remain
conjectural. However, the elimination of this loss and of the expenses and
delays incident to indirect forwarding makes a persuasive theoretical argu-
ment in favor of the direct routing practice, provided reasonable pro-
tection can be given at the same time to the depositor's interests.
20 NGoTIAnBL INsTRUMENTs LAW § 74.
-2 L. R. 9 Q. B. 428 (1874). It 'was held here that the drawer of a
cheek 'was not discharged but continued responsible to the payee.
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it is said, inasmuch as he himself made it possible by drawing
on the drawee in the first place.22 Of course this is merely ra-
tionalization sanctioning the custom prevailing, among English
banks to, forward certain items directly to the.banks on which
drawn.
The American courts have quite generally held that proof of
custom to forward to the drawee is no defense to the forward-
ing bank, in effect holding that the practice is against public
policy, 23 but the question whether forwarding by mail consti'
tutes a good presentment does not appear to hav0 been closely
contested. The question was raised in Citizens BnI v. First Na-
tio l Bazn ,24 an Iowa case, but there the drawee had promptly
returned the check for insufficieht funds. The court in holding
such presentment good stressed the fact that no prejudice re-
sulted from the direct forwarding.25 But there are many cases
where notes have been left with the bank at which they were
payable, and in none of these has the court held the present-
ment bad, the contest usually centering on whether some formal
act of presentment by the bank to itself is required.20 In view
of the possible uncertainty, however, it would seem desirable
to expressly sanction presentments by mail, the ilcreased risk
in isolated cases being one that secondary parties can be asked
to bear in the interest of more efficient collection meth6ds.
Closely related to this problem is one constituting a more
serious risk to the depositor. If we adopt the view that the
drawee is an agent to present to itself, and that merely holding
a demand or matured instrument constitutes a presentment,
the instrument would have to be paid or treated as dishonored
on the day of its receipt.2 7 Thus it would seem to follow that
the drawee should give notices of dishonor and take the usual
steps to charge secondary parties.&28 There is no objection to
22 See Bailey v. Bodenham, 16 C. B. (N. S.) 288, 296 (1864). This
theory would probably not be pressed to the extent of giving the drawer
one day to present to itself and then one day to return the instrument
to itself upon dishonor. PAGET, THE LAW OF BANKING (3d ed. 1922) 838.
23 MORse, op. cit. supra note 12, § 236, n. 6. The direct forwarding
statutes have changed this attitude. State v. Bismarck Bank, 57 N. D.
52, 220 N. W. 636 (1928)7
21135 Iowa 605, 113 N. W. 481 (1907).
25 The court said, "where prejudice is shown, such negligence has been
considered sufficient to discharge the indorser."
2 Farmers' and M erchants' Bank of Sun Prairie v. Weffald, 227 N. W.
234 (Wis. 1929); see BxGELoW, LAW oF BILLs, NoTEs AND CHoxKs (3d
ed. 1928) § 342.
27NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 89.
28In order to comply with Negotiable Instruments Law, § 90, notices
given by the drawee would have to be regarded as given "on behalf of
the holder." See BIGELow, op. cit. supra note 26, § 395.
[Vol. 89
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putting this responsibility upon the drawee, but the experience
has been that because of- subsequent failure, the claim against
it in case of default would in a great many instances be of little
value. If we disregard the agency idea and treat the trans-
action" as being merely a presentment, comparable to a counter
presentment, then it would be the forwarding bank which should
give notices upon dishonor by the drawee, which of course would
be impracticable, due to lack of information. It would be pos-
sible, however, to excuse delay on the part of the forwarding
bank until it should come into receipt of information as to the
fate of the collection. In the usual case it wold seem preferable
to require the drawee to give notice.
In the case of Blakwelder v. Fergus Motor Co.,0 the Mon-
tana court interpreted its statute making it "due diligence" to
forward items directly to the drawee as authorizing presentment
in that manner, but said that should the forwarding bank know
of the failing condition of the drawee it would not be a proper
presentment. o Further it held that inasmuch as there had been
several days delay without notice of dishonor being given to
the drawer of the check, he was discharged.3' The least that
should be done in this situation is to place responsibility on the
forwarding banks to use care to ascertain the condition of the
drawee and payor banks to which items are forwarded direct.
Obviously though this" would not afford as complete protection
as if the item had been forwarded to a local bank for personal
presentation. Probably it should also be provided that a delay
on the part of the drawee in protesting a dishonored item or
in giving notice of dishonor should be excused, at least in those
cases where the drawee subsequently fails.
A still more difficult case is presented where the drawee or
payor bank continues solvent, but either refuses to receive an
item altogether, or having received it delays indefinitely. 'Pre-
sentment by mail affords no direct check on such tactics at all
to be compared with presentment through a correspondent.
Viewing the drawee as an agent of the owner of the item,32 it
-9 80 Mont. 374, 260 Pac. 734 (1927).30 See in this connection Stout Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 25 F. (2d) 841
"(C. C. A. 5th, 1928).
S1 Of course under the proposed amendment to § 186 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law the drawer in such case -would be discharged only to
the extent of the loss caused by the delay-presumably the delay in giving
notice of dishonor. See Britton, Proposed Amendmcnts to tho TUrnform
Negotiable Inst-rzzrwats Law (1928) 22 ILL. L. RBv. 815. The situation
would continue serious as to indorsrs, as they might be completely dis.
charged.
3 Under the Massachusetts collection rule, -which prevails generally
either by decision, statute, or stipulation, each bank handling a collec-
tion item is deemed to be the agent of the owner. It would follow that
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would seem that it could be made to respond in damages, not
only, as above discussed, for failing to give proper notices of
dishonor, but for delaying to collect payment from itself as
crawee, assuming the item was duly presented and the drawer's
account was sufficient. The difficulty arises in that, on familiar
principles, a drawee cannot be compelled to pay an uncertified or
unaccepted item, even if the drawer's account is adequate.
33
Further, banks, not being in a class with public utilities, may
pick and choose their customers and so apparently need not even
receive any particular collection.34 But there have been certain
limitations inposed'by the courts upon this position which it is
believed should be codified.
In the first place a distinction is to be drawn between items
forwarded to the drawee by its usual correspondents and items
sent in by others. For example, in a recent Minnesota case,16
a bank which had a clearing arrangement with another bank in
the same town whereby balances were settled by draft became
unwilling longer to receive its associate's draft in settlement, but
did not want openly to break the relationship. Later, upon
receiving from a correspondent certain items on this bank for
collection, it returned them at once by mail without presentinent.
Before any other means of collecting could be arranged the
drawee bank failed. The court held the collecting bank respon-
sible for the loss on the ground that, had it made prompt pre-
sentment, payment could still have been had. This of course
calls for developing a special category of items forwarded by
customers, which would be entitled to special consideration.
Applying this argument to items forwarded to the drawee, it
would mean that the drawee must at least continue to receive
paper from its correspondents, where no notice to the contrary
had previously been given to them.
Where the item has been received by the drawee, its duty is
somewhat clearer but by no means definitely determined. In
Standard Trust Co. v. National Commercial Bank," the drawee
the drawee, to the extent that it occupies an agency relation, is agent of
the depositor. For a brief discussion of the New York and Massachusetts
collection rules, their origin and relative desirability, see Comment (1924)
33 YA. E L. T. 753, n. 1.
33 For a discussion of the possibility of the holder having a right against
the drawee upon a theory of equitable assignment, see Comment (1927)
37 YALE L. J. 626.
3 4 See dicta in Jaselli v. Riggs National Bank, 36 App. D. C. 159 (1911),
31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 763 (1911).
;5 McEnelly v. American Nat. Bank of St. Paul, 172 Minn. 204, 214
N. W. 922 (1927).
36240 Fed. 303 (C. C. A. 4th, 1917). See also" the second ground for




received the check but delayed remittance until after the
drawer's account had become exhausted, a note of the drawer
payable to the bank in the interim having been charged against
the account. The courj held the drawee liable in damages to the
forwarder. The many cases where depositors have lodged notes
with the bank at which payable afford further basis for this
recovery.37 By thus stressing the agency part of the drawee's
dual position, however, the courts are apparently placing the
drawee in a position which is almost equivalent to that of accept-
ance 3 -that is, in the case of duly presented and properly
payable items.
There is a great deal of uncharted ground in what constitutes
proper presentment for this purpose. For example, may the
drawee receiving a bearer item by mail insist upon the indorse-
ment of the forwarding bank? 29 May it further insist upon
the forwarding bank's guaranty of prior indorsements? 40 Again
37That the drawee may not give priority to its own claims against its
depositor, at least as to moneys subsequently deposited, seems fairly well
established. Kilsby v. Williams, 5 B. & Ald. 815 (1822).
381t is clear that this could not be a technical acceptance under the
provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law, §§ 132 and 137, and equally
clear that mere delay on the part of the drawee would not amount to
a conversion under the proposed amendment to § 137 discussed hereafter.
But some courts, at a loss for a remedy in this situation, have held that
the drawee by delaying payment for several days should be deemed to
have acaepted or certified the check. Cf. Miller v. Farmers State Bank
of Arco, 165 Alnn. 339, 206 N. W. 930 (1925), and cases cited. Recovery
should no doubt often be allowed in such case, but preferably on the theory
of the Standard Trust Company case.
-9 It is usually said that the indorsement of the holder operates merely
as a receipt to the drawee. Neither § 65 nor § 66 of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law defining the contract of indorsement indicates that there is
any obligation to the drawee. But it is usual to insist on an indorse-
ment. See discussion of this problem by Klaus, Identiftcation of the Holdci,
a d Tender of Receipt on the Counter-Presentation of Vhcc7X (1929) 13
MuN. L. Rav. 281.40 In the opinion of the writer the drawee should be entitled to demand
the indorsement of the holder as a condition of payment. Further, the
writer has suggested that the effect of an indorsement as respects the
drawee or payor of an instrument should be stated substantially as follows:
"rEvery person, whether an agent or not, who without qualification in-
dorses a negotiable or non-negotiable instrument issued by or drawn on
or payable at a bank, warrants to such bank:
(a) that he lias a good title to the instrument,
(b) that it has not been raised or otherwise altered, and
(c) that he has no knowledge that the drawer's signature is forged or
unauthorized."
The foregoing appears as § 7 in the First Tentative Draft of a Uniform
Bank Collections Act, prepared by the writer, with the assistance of his
colleague Mr. Wayne L. Townsend, and appearing in the report of the
Committee on a Uniform Act on Collection by Banks to the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1929.
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there is uncertainty as to the priority to be given to the item
presented by mail in event of the many contingencies that can
arise. There seems to be fairly good authority, in accord with
the Stamndard Tr=st Company case, that such items take pre-
cedence over claims due to the bank which may be charged
against the account, at least as to claims of, the bank accruing
after receipt of the item.4 It is probable, however, that a stop
order or an attachment notice arriving subsequent to the receipt
of the item but prior to its actual payment would, defeat col-
lection. It is believed that this situation should be clarified and,
to the extent practicable, items by mail should be given priority
of payment.
Another matter to consider in this connection is the pro-
posed amendment to Section 137 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law.42 In the relatively rare case where a drawee intentionally
destroys a check forwarded to it for payment or refuses on
demand made 24 hours after receipt of the item to return it,
the drawee will be deemed under the amended section to have
"converted" the instrument and become liable in damages. Where
the holder is a holder in due course, and presumably, although
the point is not covered, where the holder acquired the instru-
ment through or on behalf of a holder in due course, the more
usual' case, damages are fixed at the face amount of the bill.
Of course there is no 24 hour custom as to items left for pay-
ment or certification and none should be proposed even" by in-
ference. A demand, made at any time, for the return of an
item forwarded by mail for payment or certification, which is
refused, should still constitute a conversion, as at common law.
Further, to afford complete protection the section hould be
broadened to include notes and other instruments as well as
bills.
Probably the situation most in need of clarification relates
to the question of payment. When is an item forwarded to the
drawee by mail to be deemed paid, and what is the significance
of payment? The Negotiable Instruments Law, here too, con-
templated only personal presentation, which of course would
result in a surrender of the instrument on receipt of the money,
and would thus present no particular legal difficulty.43 No ques-
tion as to the effect of cancelling the instrument, of charging the
drawer's account, of giving credit to the forwarder, or of any
of the other facts involved in bank payment of items received
-nIn those states which have not adopted § 87 of the Negotiable In-
struments Law authorizing the payor bank to pay notes of the maker
upon presenta:tion, this result would apparently not follow.42 Britton, op. cit. supra note 31, at 827; see also Turner, Revison, of
the Negotiable Inst=tments Law (1928) 38 YALE L. . 25, 51.
'43 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENTS LAw § 74.
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by mail was anticipated. As the case stands today the decision
are in hopeless conflict," and it is believed that the uncertainty
operates principally to the disadvantage of the holder.
It is important to differentiate the situations which most fre-
quently arise. In general, items are forwarded either for credit
or for remittance. In the case of the item sent for credit there
are several points in the subsequent handling which could be
selected as evidencing payment. First, when credit is given,
whether actually charged to the drawer or not; second, when the
instrument is cancelled or cancelled and credited; and third,
when charged to the drawer or collected directly from the
drawer if his account is inadequate, and whether cancelled or
credited to the forwarder or not. Similar difficulty is presented
in the case of the item sent for remittance. Should the time
of preparing the remittance draft and cancelling the item, the
time of mailing the remittance draft, the time of charging the
drawer's account, or some combination of these-be selected?
It is doubtful, in view of the conflict in the decisions, that
a close examination of cases is particularly profitable, for in
any case it will be necessary to make a more or less arbitrary
decision. The statute drafted by the American Bankers Associa-
tion -5 selects the time when "the amount is finally ch7arge to
the account of the maker or drawer" as the point when an item
forwarded by mail should be regarded as paid, thus by implica-
tion excluding all earlier times."G The fast consideration would
seem to be that a definite act be selected, one reasonably capable
of being established as a fact. 7 It has long been settled in the
4 PAToN, DiGssT (1926) Opinions 1227a and 1228a.
5 The American Bankers Association's proposed Bank Collection Code
was drafted in 1928 and submitted to legislatures meeting in 1929. It
has now been adopted in the following states: Ind. Acts 1929, c.'164;
Mld. Laws 1929, c. 454; Mo. Laws 1929, p. 205; Neb. Laws 1929, c. 41;
N. J. Laws 1929; N. M. Laws 1929, c. 138; N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 689;
Wash. Laws 1929, c. 203; Wis. Laws 1929, c. 354.
A special committee of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
commenced a study with the object of drafting a more comprehensive
statute covering the whole subject of bank collections. Inasmuch as legis-
lation in this field directly affects the Negotiable Instruments Law pre-
pared by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, it is particularly
important that the many short statutes and conflicting decisions bearing
on the collectiofi of negotiable paper be covered by them in a single
uniform statute.
4 The provision sponsored by the American Bankers Association reads:
'Were the item is received by mail by a solvent drawee or payor bank,
it shall be deemed paid when the amount is finally charged to the account
of the maker or drawer."
47 The case of most difficulty is where the drawee has received an item
and simply failed to do anything-a situation which often occurs. In
perhaps the leading case, that of Baldwin's Bank v. Smith, dupra note
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case of counter deposits that the credit given to the depositor
of a check will be taken to constitute a final act of payment,
whether or not the drawer's account is then or subsequently
charged. 8 If this analogy were to be applied to deposits by
mail, as seems rbasonable, the credit or credit advice would
be determinative,"9 regardles of whether any charge had been
made, or could be made, to the drawer's account. It is believed
that this point should be adopted, but at the same time, if the
drawer's account has in fact been charged, or if he has actually
paid the money to the drawee, this fact also should constitute
payment,50 regardless of whether any credit is subsequently
given to the forwarder of the item or whether a remittance
draft is sent.
An abstract discussion of payment, apart from a consideration
of the consequences, is of course more or less pointless. To
wait until an itbm has been finally cha'ged to the drawer's
account- 1 before calling it paid is to subject the transaction
36, the maker telephoned to an officer of the bank, and the latter's implied
assent to the maker's instruction to pay the note was held to constitute
a sufficient act of payment to discharge the maker. Cf. Marine Bank &
Trust Co. v. Triplett, 149 Miss. 274, 115 So. 202 (1928). It is believed
that these cases, where the drawee does nothing, should not be treated
as cases of payment.
4 8 Cf. Oddie v. National City Bank, 45 N. Y. 735 (1871) ; Levy v. Bank,
1 Binn. 27 (Pa. 1802). In the first of these cases the drawer's account
was subsequently found to be inadequate and in the second the drawer's
signature was forged; in both the item was held to be finally paid when
credit was given.
It is believed desirable, in view of the enormous number of checks
in use and the practical impossibility of verifying each one upon deposit
over the counter for credit, to relax this rule, by treating the payment
as merely provisional-thus giving the bank a reasonable opportunity
to determine whether payment is in order. See in this connection Ocean
Park Bank v. Rogers, 6 Cal. App. 678, 92 Pac. 879 (1907). But in the
case of items received by mail, where credit need not be given at once,
it would seem that credit when given should be final.
49 There have been few cases where the drawer's account has not also
been charged. Where the credit has been given by mistake, it should
be revocable as against one not a good faith holder. See Aigler, The
Doctrine of Price v. Neal (1926) 24 MICH. L. RBv. 809. Also see Walnut
Hill Bank v. Nat. Reserve Bank, 141 App. Div. 475, 126 N. Y. Supp.
430 (1st Dep't 1910). Otherwise the drawee should be liable. Oregon
Iron & Steel Co. v. Kelso State Bank, 129 Wash. 109, 224 Pac. 569 (1924).
5OCf. Planters' Mercantile Co. v. Armour Packing Co., 109 Miss. 470,
69 So. 293 (1915). Where the drawee is hopelessly insolvent at the
time of charging the drawer's account a different situation is presented.
Cf. Exchange Bank v. Sutton Bank, 78 Md. 577, 28 Atl. 563 (1894)
(involving suit on original obligation).
RxIn posting checks for payment it is a matter of chance ordinarily
whether the check will be credited or charged first. The bank does not
consider the transaction complete until both operations are finished and
proven. A merely tentative charge or credit such as this should not alone
480 [Vol. 39
BANK COLLECTIONS
for some additional time to all of those contingencies which
can defeat collection. For example, should the drawer die,
or become bankrupt, or assign for the benefit of creditors
before a final charge, the item would be returned dishonored."-
Again, except for the possibility of giving priority by statute
as suggested above, stop-orders or attachments would be given
effect for that much longer, a result which is believed to be
undesirable. In these situations it is apparently to the interest
of both bank and depositor that the earliest practicable point
be selected to indicate payment. From the standpoint of
secondary parties, delay obviously tends to increase their risk
correspondingly. Of course, to postpone decision until a "final
charge," whatever that might come to mean, would operate to
the advantage of the paying bank in the PRice v. Neal situa-
tion,5 3 but it is doubtful whether this should be allowed to over-
weigh the foregoing considerations. In event of the failure of
the drawde, the question is presented in still a different light.
Here, for example, should the bank fail after having credited
its correspondent, but before charging the drawer's account or
cancelling the item, the owner no doubt would prefer to have
the item regarded as unpaid, and thereby have his rights against
the drawer or maker preserved. To be sure, it is not essential
that the same facts constitute payment in each of these differ-
ent situations, but the greater convenience in application weighs
heavily in favor of a uniform single concept, if it will satis-
factorily serve all purposes.
The consideration which has always given the banker most
concern in handling collections is the possibility of the cor-
respondent or drawee becoming insolvent. During the last few
years approximately one-sixth of the banks in the country
have failed. This risk more than any other has practically
forced the adoption of the Massachusetts collection rule, putting
operate as payment. Cf. First Nat. Bank v. National Park Bank, 181
App. Div. 103, 168 N. Y. Supp. 422 (1st Dep't 1917).
52 In Nineteenth Ward Bank v. First National Bank, 184 Mtass. 49,
67 N. E. 670 (1903), the plaintiff had sent a note to the defendant, the
bank at which it -was payable, and the latter's cashier had cancelled the
note and drawn a remittance draft when advised by telephone that the
maker had assigned. It was held that the note ivas paid by the bank
to itself and only its duty to the forwarder as collecting agent to com-
plete -remittance remained. Cf. Hunt v. Security State Bank, 91 Ore.
362, 179 Pac. 248 (1919), where the drawer stopped payment at about
the same point, and the item was held not to have been paid. Here the
'ank failed.
53 It seems quite probable that the phrase "final charge" will be unduly
provocative of litigation, particularly in this situation, where, for e.xmmple,
-the drawee learns at some indefinite time after the charge that the account
-was inadequate or that the drawer's signature was forged.
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the loss, in large measure, on the depositor. Thus, should a
correspondent receive the proceeds of a collection and fail before
remittance, the risk, under the Massachusetts rule, is on the
depositor; the particular correspondent who has failed is re-
garded as his agent. It would follow, applying that rule to the
direct forwarding case, that should the drawee fail after having
paid an item and before remitting to its correspondent, the
loss would fall upon the depositor; " the drawee to be regarded
in effect as the depositor's agent to remit.1
Where the drawee has credited its correspondent or sent a
remittance item to it-facts which 'ordinarily would constitute
"payment" of the collection item-and then failed before the
credit could be availed of or the remittance item collected, the
depositor has heretofore been in a considerably more favorable
position. It is necessary to make a sharp distinction between
the matter of crediting the correspondent,"G pursuant, of course,
to an understanding, and that of sending a remittance draft,
which involves no entry in the drawing account. In the first
situation, it could be argued, to be sure, that the credit to the
forwarding bank was "mere bookkeeping," and that, inasmuch
as it had not been drawn against, the drawee bank as agent of
the depositor under the Massachusetts collection rule should be
regarded as still holding the proceeds, the risk thus being placed
upon the depositor. The statute proposed by the American
Bankers Association, however, very commendably adopts the
rule of the better reasoned cases 57 that this constitutes a trans-
5 In case the instrument has not been paid and is held by the drawee
upon becoming insolvent there would seem no doubt but that the owner
could ordinarily reclaim the instrument from the receiver. The older
cases are cited in ScoT, CAsEs oN TausTs (1919) 77, n. 1. -
55 Where the drawee has remitted by draft some courts have invoked
the idea of conditional payment and treated the original obligation as
unpaid where the remittance draft has been dishonored. Graham v.
Proctorville Warehouse Co., 189 N. C. 583, 127 S. E. 540 (1925). If
the remittance draft were to have been settled for in turn by another
remittance draft; and so on, it would be possible on this theory to reverse
a number of transactions. most courts hold that the issuance of a
remittance draft, although the same is never paid, constitutes a dis-
charge of the original item. Odle v. Barnes, 117 Tex. 174, 2 S. W. (2d)
577 (1927).
GO By crediting is meant crediting the drawing account. Such a credit
has generally been considered to establish a debtor-creditor relation de-
feating claim foz preference. Equitable Trust Company v. Rochling, 215
U. S. 248, 48 Sup. Ct. 58 (1927).
67 Stone v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 145 S. C. 166, 143 S. E. 27
(1928); Arnold v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 195 N. C. 345, 142 S. E.




mission to the forwarding bankt,5 and that the risk is therefore
on it and not on the depositor. *Where the remittance has been
by draft, the ancient rule that an agent accepts at his peril
anything other than money on account of a draft owing to his
principal. has been kept in force by the courts to aid the
depositor. This rule was reaffirmed as late as 1924 by the
Supreme Court in the now' famous Malloy case c5 where the
depositor was given a cause of action against the Federal Re-
serve bank which accepted a draft, subsequently dishonored,
in payment of a collection item.
The Malloy decision was denounced by bankers as archaic and
unworkable. Quite rightly they stated that it would be impos-
sible to handle the volume of collections required to transact
modern business if only money could be used in transmission.
A great many banks. accordingly stipulated broadly for the
privilege of receiving any bank draft or check in payment of
collections.6' Again, in many states statutes have been adopted
sanctioning collection by draft, and relieving the collecting bank
of responsibility in event the remittance item should be dis-
honored t2 Indeed, it has just been held in Wisconsin, 3 without
Gs The provision sponsored by the American Bankers Association reads:
"Whenever such agent collecting bank shall request or accept in payment
an unconditional credit -which has been given to it on the books of the
drawee or payor or on the books of any other bank, such agent collecting
bank shall become debtor for such item and shall be responsible therefor
as if the proceeds were actually received by it in money."
W Ward v. Evans, 2 Ld. Raym. 928 (1103).
6 0 Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, suprm note 15.
61It is believed that a distinction should be drawn between mail collec-
tions by draft, -where practically speaking no other course is possible, and
local collections by draft, where it is possible to make collection in money
or other satisfactory form. In other words, local banks are in an espe-
cially good position to ascertain the standing of each other and can
reasonably be expected to take responsibility for collections. The American
Bankers Association has, however, advocated authorizing local banks also
to receive payments by bank draft without responsibility. It is possible
that this provision will prove somewhat illusory when taken before the
courts, as it should certainly be regarded as negligence for a collecting
bank to take a draft from a drawee bank known to be in failing cir-
cunstances. This being, so, it is believed the gain commercially to be
derived from fixing a- point when an item can be said to have been paid
-past the possibility of charge back-outweighs the incidental protection
to the local bank
62One of the most instructive cases on the point, discussing the statutes
and the changes adopted by the Reserve banks following the Malloy
decision, is Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 172 Minn.
58, 214 N. W. 918 (1927). The court said, in disapproving the result
of the Malloy case: In fact, we know that the banking business could
not be conducted without extraordinary and needless expense to the public,
or at all, perhaps, if in the collection and clearance of commercial paper
only currency was to be used.'




aid of statute or stipulation, and almost without precedent, that
such practice is to be sanctioned as the only feasible way of
effecting collection, and, being the one contemplated by the
owner, should be at his risk. Of course one may well grant
that agent banks must receive and make transmissions by draft,
but it does not follow at all that this must necessarily be at
the depositor's risk. 4 However, it would not be possible for
banks to assume the losses that have occurred in the last few
years on remittance drafts and still continue to handle without
charge the vast quantity of items now being collected through
banks. Possibly the alternative of shifting the risk from the
bank is the lesser evil."
There is sharp division of opinion among bankers whether
the owner of the item or the drawer should bear the loss result-
ing when the drawee fails before its remittance draft can be
collected, The argument parallels that of fifty years ago when
checks were being used increasingly in place of exchange drafts
to effect payments. G Should the buyer pay the collection charges
on his check as he had formerly paid the costs of buying ex-
change, or should they be absorbed by the seller? As a matter
of fact these costs were, by the system of immediate credit and
circuitous routing, largely absorbed by the banks. In the present
situation, it is pointed out that it is the drawer who selects
the drawee bank and it is contended that for this reason he
should bear the risk of its continued solvency OT until its re-
mittance draft is paid.6 8 Of course it can be replied, as in the
argument concerning costs of collection, that the payee does
64 The depositor knows that his bank will have to handle his collections
through its employees, but it has never been held that such knowledge
operates to put the risk of their negligence or misconduct on the depositor.
65 Although the charge to cover this risk might be small, the mere fact
that any charge must be made .would increase bookkeeping costs and
slow up collections. Just how great this would be does not appear to
have been determined as a matter of fact.
68 SPAHR, op. cit. opra note 1, at 117.
0TA similar argument is "presented as to whether holder or maker
should bear the risk of the continued solvency of the bank at which a
note has been made payable-where the maker has a sufficient deposit at
maturity but the holder delays presentment until after the bank fails.
Federal Inteamediate Credit Bank v. Epstin, 151 S. C. 67, 148 S. E. 713
(1929), discussed in (1929) 39 YAM L. J. 277, and Note (1929) 18 CALri.
L. R v. 56; Of. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 186 as to the drawer of
a check.
GaThe usual rule is that the drawer is discharged upon payment, and
ordinarily the sending of a remittance draft constitutes payment for
this purpose whether the remittance draft is itself paid or not. The
leading authority is Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, enpra note 15. See
also supra note 50.
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not have to receive payment by check, but may insist on settle-
ment in any form satisfacto17 to it, as, for example, by an
extension of the use of the banker's credit. The argument is
wholly inconclusive.
It is now the law in some eight or nine states, however, by
virtue of the collection code sponsored by the American Bankers
Associationeg that where the drawee's remittance draft is dis-
honored, the collecting agent may at its election treat the collec-
tion item as dishonored by non-payment, and recourse may be
had against all prior parties70 This means that if the maker
of a note which has been sent to his bank for collection and
remittance should pay the amount in cash to his bank and
receive back the cancelled instrument, circumstances which
usually have been held to amount to payment, the maker and
any indorsers could nevertheless still be held liable at the elec-
tion of the collecting bank, provided only the bank's remittance
draft should not be paid in due course. Whatever the difficulties
of the depositor's position, and of the banks effecting collection
of their own paper, it would seem clear that this disregard of
the position of other parties should not be generally adopted as
a solution.
It is only fair to say that up to this point the depositor has
C See statutes cited aupra, note 45.
7o The provision has such an important bearing on the law of negotiable
instruments that it will be quoted in full, as follows:
"Where an item is duly presented by mail to the drawee or payor,
whether or not the same has been charged to the account of the maker
or drawer thereof or returned to such maker or drawer, the agent collecting
bank so presenting may, at its election, exercised with reasonable diligence,
treat such item as dishonored by non-payment and recourse may be bad
upon prior parties thereto in any of the following cases:
(1) Where the check or draft of the drawee or payor bank upon an-
other bank received in payment shall not be paid in due course;
(2) Where the drawee or payor bank shall without request or authority
tender as payment its own check or draft upon itself or other instru-
ment upon'which it is primarily liable;
(3) Where the drawee or payor bank shall give an unrequested or un-
authorized credit therefor on its books or the books of another bank; or
(4) Where the drawee or payor shall retain such item without re-
mitting therefor on the day of receipt or on the day of maturity if
payable otherwise than on demand and received by it prior to or on such
day of maturity."
7' It is evident that the drawer or maker is not particularly interested
in having items forwarded directly; his account is debited somewhat cooner
than it otherwise would be if collection were made through the agency
of a local bank. Furthermore, it is not apparent why the drawer or
maker should also be made to bear the risk of collection of his bank's remit-
kance draft. Had the item- been collected through the agency of a local




been rather badly worsted by the adoption of the direct routing
practice. With his original item paid and all parties thereon
discharged, with the collecting banks relieved of responsibility
and the drawee insolvent, there remains only the possibility of
giving him a preferred claim upon the liquidation of the drawee.
Again it is important to distinguish between the items forwarded
for credit and those sent for collection and remittance. As to
the former there is no question but that an ordinary depositor-
bank, debtor-creditor, relation arises when the item is paid and
credited. In such case it has long been settled that no preferred
claim will be allowed. 2 But in the latter situation there has
been wide conflict in the authorities.
It is orthodox to say, without distinguishing between credit
and remittance situations, that the agency relation of a collecting
bank ends upon collection and a debtor-creditor relation takes
its place.73 Just why this alleged metamorphosis takes place
in the remittance situation is not clear, although it probably
grows out of the feeling that it is equitable to treat all creditors
alike. Various evidentiary facts are seized upon to prove that
the parties must have intended a debtor-creditor relation, the
chief among these being the fact that it is understood that the
collecting bank may mingle the proceeds and remit in exchange.1'
Obviously to insist on this circumstance to the exclusion of other
considerations in a day when an increasing number of draft
transmissions must be made by agents, when in fact the method
is being forced on the principal as in the direct routing situa-
tion, is to insist on an outworn rationalization in disregard of
changing conditions.7
5
72 ]Matter of the Franklin Bank, 1 Paige 249 (N. Y. 1828).
73 ScoTr, op. cit. supra note 54, at 67.
74 In Citizens Bank v. Bradley, 186 S. C. 511, 134 S. E. 510 (1026),
the drawee paid the collection items but failed before its remittance draft
could be collected. The court in denying a preferred claim said,
e. . . before the collection is made the relation between the owner of
the paper and the collecting bank is that of principal and agent; but . . .
after the collection has been mapde, the relation of debtor and creditor
arises. This conclusion is based upon the custom of banks to credit those
for whom collections have been made and remit in the bank's usual
exchange... 11
This argument is true in the case where the forwarder maintains a
deposit account with the collecting bank but it has no validity in the
remittance case where no credit is in fact given to the forwarder.
75 The Iowa court in the ease of Leach v. Citizens State Bank, 203 Iowa
782, 211 X. W. 522 (1926), met the forwarder's demand for a preferred
claim by likening the transaction to an ordinary counter presentment and
refused the idea that the drawee was in any sense an agent. To be sure,
if the'holder standing before the counter of the drawee elects to take its
certification or its cashier's check, there is no denying the fact that he has
trusted generally to the bank's credit and should be put on a par with
486 [Vol. 39
BANK COLLECTIONS
In the last analysis the issue is between the owner of the
collection item and the general creditors of the failed drawee,
including its depositors. It must not be forgotten that had the
item been presented to the drawee through the local clearing
house and paid, the amount would have been irrevocably
separated from the assets of the failed bank. This would not
be regarded as in any sense inequitable to the depositors. When,
for reasons of general efficiency, this additional collection step
is eliminated, and the payment is received by the drawee for
direct remittance, the general creditors are in no worse posi-
tion if a preferred claim is given the forwarder. In fact if a
preferred claim is to be denied, the result would be to improve
the position of the general depositors merely because of a
change in collection practice which they had no part in bring-
ing about. To allow the holder a preferred claim in large meas-
ure compensates him for the many increased risks forced upon
him by the direct routing Iiractice7O
There is no question, however, but that the device of first
creating a trust in order to make a distinction between types
of creditors is not only clumsy and uncertain but slow and
expensive of administration as well. The question of whether
or not there is an "augmentation" of assets is continually being
litigated in the banking cases -with a wide conflict in result.77
The tracing requirement gives still further difficulty, particularly
in the banking cases where ordinarily no money, as such, was
received, transfers being effected by credit entries.7r It is be-
other creditors. It should be obvious though that the distant owner of
a collection item, for all practical purposes has no such election in the
matter. The Virginia court, in the case of Federal Reserve Bank v.
Peters, 139 Va. 45, 123 S. E. 379 (1924), recognized these factors and
gave the depositor a preferred claim. The Iowa decision still represents
the majority view, although there is quite respectable authority for the
position of the Virginia court. See Comment (1927) 36 YA=nL, T. 682.
'7A similar remedy should be afforded to the owner -where a corres-
pondent bank fails after having :eceived the proceeds of a collection
and before its remittance draft is paid.
7 7 Where payment has been made to the collecting bank by check upon
itself the federal courts and some state courts hold that there has been
no augmentation of the assets of the failed bank, so that no preferred
claim can be allowed. Hecker-Jones-3ewell Milling Co. v. Cosmopolitan
Trust Co., 242 Mass. 181, 136 X. E. 333 (1922); Ellerbe v. Studebaker
Corp., 21 F. (2d) 993 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927). The court in the case last;
cited showed considerable reluctance at following the strict augmentation
rule. Many state courts make no distinctions, for this purpose, between
payments by check and those by cash. Cf. Messenger v. Carroll Trust
& Say. Bank, 193 Iowa 608, 187 N. W. 545 (1922) ; Thomas v. Llothersead,
128 Okla. 157, 261 Pac. 363 (1927).
78 For example, there is a question -whether the trust Tes may be traced
into the failed bank's accounts 'with other banks. Cf. Lane v. First Na-
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lieved this situation should be corrected, as has been done in
several states, by. providing simply that the forwarder is to be
given a certain priority upon liquidation.", The saving to follow
through eliminating the tracing requirement alone would be
large. In fairness to general creditors it is believed the for-
warder's preferred position should not extend, as proposed by
the American Bankers Association, to the failed bank's real
estate, bank building and fixtures. Only the relatively liquid
assets, or those which might conceivably have been used in
making payment of the item had it been presented by a local
collecting bank, should be subject to the forwarder's claim.
In conclusion, it should be recognized that this emphasis on
the risks and hazards of collection gives a distorted view of
the actual situation. For the most part the collection system
functions smoothly and efficiently without loss. The risks in-
volved have gained undue prominence during the last ten years
owing to the abnormally large number of bank failures. Some
measures must be taken in the near future, possibly by an
extension of branch banking or of chain banking, or a strength-
ening of banking laws, to eliminate this risk. There seems little
doubt, however, but that the direct routing practice will be
extended, and it is believed can be extended with reasonable
fairness to all parties if carefully drawn legislation covering
the points above discussed is adopted in the several states.
tional Bank of Vale, 281 Pac. 172 (Ore. 1929), (1929) 39 YAxM L. . 570,
where the court disregarded the tracing requirement as to such accounts.
70 See NORTH CAROLINA BANKING LAW, c. 113, § 1 (14), N. C. Pub.
Laws 1927, p. 356.
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